Why the Kosovo war was a turning point in western politics towards this region; what is the story with gas crisis, and what with self-inferiorization of Eastern Europe; what is the attitude of balkan societies towards sexual and ethnic minorities - these are the topics we covered in conversation with Maria Todorova, renowned bulgarian historian who specialized for the history of Balkans in modern period. Her book from 1997. "Imagining the Balkans" strongly influenced scientific perception of Balkans. Maria Todorova is currently employed as a Professor of history at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Balkan region is now in quite different situation than twelve years ago when you published renown book Imagining the Balkans - instead of several wars, authoritarian regimes and "ghettoisation", in the whole region we have "euro-atlantistic" normalisation. Still, there are several protectorates and frozen conflicts. What is the perspective for this region's countries?

Predictions are the preferred realm of political scientists, politicians and journalists and, for the most part, they have it wrong (even if, by chance, they end up correctly guessing). History is - fortunately - a far too complex process, with unexpected turns and unpredictable contingencies.

When Imagining the Balkans appeared in 1997, I would not have been able to venture on the «persectives for the region.» Indeed, it was in 1997, in the aftermath of the invitation to the three former Warsaw Pact countries-Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic- to join NATO (they became members in 1999), that Tony Judt wrote that this would create "a sort of depressed Eurosuburb beyond which 'Byzantine Europe' would be made to fend for itself, too close to Russia for the West to make an aggressive show of absorption and engagement."

Things changed almost overnight with the beginning of NATO expansion in 1997. Since 1989, the question of the alliance's mission has never ceased to be high on both the European and U.S. agenda. With the disbanding of the Warsaw pact in 1991 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992, NATO's main adversaries and targets had ceased to exist, and with them its raison d'être. There were serious plans in Europe to disband NATO and build alternative security systems confined to the continent. Yet NATO remained the only truly transatlantic institution in which the United States continued to play the role of a European great power, and it was reluctant to lose this position. The United States was and continues to be the chief advocate for further NATO expansion, despite a 1990 pledge that NATO would not expand beyond German borders, while Europe's proximity to and dependence on Russian natural resources make it more circumspect. In 1997 Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to join the alliance, and became members in 1999. The invitation was extended to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania in 2002, all of which joined in 2004. In 2008 another two Balkan countries-Croatia and Albania-were invited and Macedonia is bound to follow soon.

What did this NATO expansion change?

This trajectory of NATO's evolution, alongside the development of events that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, brought about the unexpected intersection of two processes. Until 1999, the international community confined its pressure on and involvement in Yugoslavia almost exclusively to the United Nations. There were a few minor UN-sanctioned NATO operations after the Srebrenica massacre and before the Dayton accord, including the maritime enforcement of the arms embargo and the brief bombing of Republika Srpska in Bosnia in 1995. However, this intervention, as well contemporaneous events in Somalia and even the First Gulf War, were aimed at restoring or preserving the status quo.

The three-month long NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, on the other hand, for all intents and purposes carried out by the United States, marked a new precedent. It effectively underwrote the secessionist claims of a minority population and set the stage for Kosovo's full independence some nine years later, another precedent, whose ominous repercussions play themselves out in the Caucasus today. This became a fundamental departure from the treatment of similar conflicts (between Palestinians and Jews in Israel, Kurds and Turks in Turkey, Kurds and Arabs in the First Gulf War, and others) where sovereignty and territorial integrity had been the dominant principle since the end of the Second World War. In another respect the Kosovo war saw what one observer has called "the rise of humanitarian hawks" and became the dress-rehearsal for American unilateralism that culminated in the Second Gulf War. In this respect, the Balkans once again became a laboratory for experimentation with new approaches and solutions.

In a way, bombing of Serbia was a turning point in attitude towards this region?

There were a host of political and moral considerations for the 1999 intervention, not least among them the desire to revive the last European organization in which the United States played a leading role. Whatever the motivations, the bombing clearly had unintended consequences. Before the Kosovo war, the dominant paradigm applied to the Balkans translated into the practical ghettoization of the region. The pre-Kosovo European Union visa regime absolved Central Europe but not the rest of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, where restrictions were placed on the movement of populations. This was balkanism in action. The rhetorical legitimization of the 1999 intervention-as defence of universal human rights-effectively brought the Balkans back into the sphere of Western politics. Both the bombing and its aftermath bound Europeans and Americans much more closely-even inextricably-to the Balkans. Through KFOR, the NATO-led force under UN mandate, both Americans and Europeans began running two official protectorates (Kosovo and Bosnia-Hercegovina). There emerged, for the first time, a significant lobby among Eurocrats who believed that it would be in Europe's best interests to bring the Balkans into the European sphere, rather than ghettoize them. Visa restrictions were suspended for two Balkan countries-Bulgaria and Romania-and they were admitted in 2007. Although a general EU expansion fatigue has set in, it is likely that Croatia, one of the three official Balkan candidates alongside Macedonia and Turkey, will be admitted in due time. Albania and the other remaining Yugoslav splinters have all been recognized as potential candidates. All of this has been accompanied by the curious but predictable subsiding of the balkanist rhetoric, though it is still encountered abundantly in journalism and fiction, as well as scholarship. Even the vocal and often spiteful objections to Turkey's accession focus on Islam, Middle Eastern culture, women's or human rights, but are not clad in the balkanist rhetoric. I am strongly in favor of Turkey's admission (although, of course, carefully prepared but not endlessly postponed).

Mutual mistrust and petty nationalism are still trademarks of the region. How much that phenomenon is "Balkan specialty", or it is just variety of what we have in Europe - for example, Northern Ireland or Basque country?

Looking at the map of Europe today, I do not think that the most abundant or outrageous examples of „mutual distrust and petty nationalism" come form the Balkan region. I don't even think that Northern Ireland and the Basque country are good examples of this rather innocuous formula. There (until 1998 in Northern Ireland, and continuing in Spain) we had/have bitter nationalism and violence. But illustrations of „mutual distrust and petty nationalism" are profuse: Poland/Germany, Russia/Ukraine, Czech Republic/Germany, the bitter conflict between Flemish and French speakers in Belgium, Hungary/Slovakia, even really petty ones (like Liechetnstein not recongnizing Slovakia and the Czech Republic), etc. By contrast, there is actually much and growing Balkan cooperation today. Even the acrimonious dispute between Greece and Macedonia shows signs of subsiding. Only the mistrust that is still going on in the region of the former Yugoslavia (what today is ridiculously named as the Western Balkans) is serious but only natural given the recent war. Just think how much efforts and how long it took Germany and France after the Second World War to overcome the legacy of bitter conflicts in order to reach haromonious relations (although they are increasingly tested in the realm of economic amd political rivalry).

On the other side, taking into account number of ethnic problems all over post-socialist countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, ex - Yugoslavia, Moldavia...) - what is the connection between socialist heritage and unsolved national and minorities questions? There have been theories that communism actually froze ethnic relations, which bursted the moment it was gone?

I believe the „frozen ethnic relations" under communism is an unfortunate cliche. What is true is that socialism (or communism) did not solve national or minority questions, despite some efforts and some claims to have done so. In some cases, as in the first couple of decades of communist rule, there were certain accommodation of minorities (e.g. cultural rights for Hungarians in Romania, for Turks in Bulgaria, etc.) which were rescinded after the 1960s with a new wave of communist nationalism. In the case of Bulgaria, far from „freezing" ethnic relations, the unfortunate policies against the ethnic Turks in the 1980s actually exacerbated ethnic relations to a boiling point.. On the other hand, since communism is officially a non-nationalist and even anti-nationalist ideology, and on top of it a system which censored expression, in the rhetorical realm there was no green light for extreme nationalism (again, with exceptions, most notoriously Ceauşescu's Romania). This allowed the legitimation and posturing of nationalists as anti-communist heroes in the post-1989 period and continuing today.

There has been much talk about Bulgaria and Romania's premature entry to EU, Union even froze some fonds meant for Bulgaria because of corruption. What is Bulgarian experience with EU, once it is inside, but at the position of periphery of Europe?

In any political change, there are winners and losers. I do not have numbers at hand but my impression is that despite existing euroscepticism, the consensus of Bulgarians is that, in the end, it is better to be inside rather than outside. This is supported for very different reasons among different social groups: for some it is the belief that the rampant corruption still will have to adjust to some kind of rule of law (or, at least, that outside of the European framework it will be even more unbearable); for others, the realization that opening the economies to the world market is slowly bringing benefits despite the social price of inequality and unfair distribution; for most, because of the increased opportunites for movement and communication. As for the peripheral status, being outside does not make it more central...

Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, to a lesser extant Croatia, are just some of the victims of late gas crisis. Interestingly, most "big" EU states are either not completely dependent on Russia, or have storages of gas - some are even profiting, selling gas with raised prices to endangered countries. So, to a certain extant is west using smaller countries as pawns in negotiations with Russia?

I hardly think this is the case. The mentioned small countries are the ones who felt the crisis most acutely, but the problem of gas dependence on Russia is a general one. The crisis (between Russia and Ukraine) was in the making for a long time and was to be expected.

On the other hand, the scandal lies elsewhere: in the sustained pressure of the EU to force the new accession countries to close their nuclear power plants as a condition for entry. This has aversely affected mostly Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, among others. In the Bulgarian case, not only did the country become solely dependent on gas, but it lost one of its few sources of income (the export of energy). And this in the face of (mostly French) attempts to monopolize the nuclear power industry in the EU.

Apart from Bosnia and Kosovo which are in fact not in a possesion of true statehood, rest of Balkans is / will at some time be in EU. But superior gaze of the west is now exchanged with exploitation by superior economies. Is EU really trying to develop the region, or are they actually trying to create some kind of "internal colonies", as a market for their products and source of cheap labour force?

What does „true statehood" mean? Recognition by everyone? UN membership? Bosnia has it. Taiwan, on the other hand, considered by the People's republic of China just a provice, does not (It is recognized by 23 states, while Kosovo was recognized by 54). Still, I guess for you Taiwan would count as a „true state." Is it then a more or less stable administration and economic wealth? Would you then count several „failed states" in Africa „no true states"? Did the beginning state formations in the Balkans in the 19th century posess "true statehood"?

Although I can be critical enough of the EU, I honestly do not believe that the endgame is to create „internal colonies." The "market/cheap labor source" model is no longer current. The accession of the Balkans to the EU has been, according to me, and will be primarily driven by politcial motives. This was true not only of Bulgaria and Romania but also back in the 1970s of Greece. Therefore I think that eventually the process will encompass also Bosnia and Kosovo.

As for the second-hand status of the region in economic terms, this will continue to be an issue, just as it is for the whole of Eastern Europe, not only the Balkans (its less wealthy part). And this type of inequality inevitably will have repercussions in the political and cultural realm. The same has been true not only vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, but also vis-a-vis Southern Europe. The North-South opposition has become only lately less severe than the West-East one.

Eastern Europe is being massively discovered by western tourists as "exotic" destination - are this remnants of balkanistic approach, just in new form?

Any human encounter (and tourism is just one type of it) operates on a system of stereotypes. As long as there are major inequalities of wealth, and significant differences in culture, these stereotypes are bound to be asymmetrical and hierarchical at the expence of the socially weaker. Of course, "balkanism" (or "orientalism" or "exoticizing") will be present in many of these encounters. On the other hand, only frequent and repeated encounters (besides, of course, education) can bring about tolerance and sensitivity toward otherness.

With economic crises looming on the horizon, can we expect rise of radical nationalistic parties and right wing populism? In Bulgaria extreme Ataka party is quite strong, in Romania it is "Great Romania party", ex - Yugoslav countries still have high emotional charge left from 90's wars?

The economic crisis surely will be politically exploited but not only by right wing or nationalist parties. I do not think, however, that "Ataka" has big electoral chances for now; it is also a rather disjointed movement. Ditto for Romania. The ex-Yugoslav realm belongs to a different category: there is the emotional charge form the 90s, there are still unresolved pressing national problems.

In most of this countries ruling elites declaratively embraced liberal - democratic worldviews. But the state is weak and unefficiant, and another problem is that societies remained fundamentaly xenophobic and conservative. Typical example is attitude of the society to sexual minorities. How is it possible to change the societies, which is much harder task than just formal enactment of laws?

I would refrain from characterizing these societies as "fundamentally xenophobic and conservative". Some parts of these societies display xenophobic attitudes toward certain groups (especially Roma), but welcome or are neutral toward others (for example, the considerable influx of East Asians); the same is true for conservatism. The transformation of sexual mores is a notioriosly difficult issue not only in these societies. In Western Europe and the US this is a process that has been affirming itself slowly and gradually and with struggle, only in the past 50 years or so. This is not a long time, and there are still ongoing debates. It is true that societies change much slower than the enactment of a law, but this is still a first step. If the active movement of population and communication exchange is preserved (as appears to be the tendency), this will inevitably take place too. Just compare it with attitudes toward women in the past 100-150 years.

Not neglecting the need to learn from the west, leaders of eastern countries themselves eagerly represent their countries as inferior. After experience with communism and still driven by fear from Russia, most of eastern countries uncritically embraced western model. Was there any other alternative than NATO and EU?

First, there is no such thing as a holistic "western model". What most East European countries embraced (partly because of strongly held ideological beliefs by their new liberal elites, partly under advice/pressure, partly by emulation of each other), was a rigid and often dogmatic neo-liberal model (much more rigid than in any «real existing» western country). As to alternatives, I do not think that there was any talk (let alone thought) of an alternative to EU accession. This was and remains the desired goal (even if on the road to this goal some of the enthusiasm might have decreased, but not disappeared). NATO is a different story. It was the belief that NATO membership is the guarantee and first stage for EU accession that drove the East European countries into the alliance. While in practice this has been the model up until now, I think this was more contingent rather than a matter of absolute correlation. NATO is essentially a transatlantic organization in which the US has dominant leverage but it is not necessarily tantamount to EU interests. For some East European countries (notably Poland) this gave a welcome ground for maneuver. Not all EU members are (or have been) NATO members. And not all NATO members are (or will be) EU members. The most notorious example is Turkey, a long-standing member of NATO. Others are Ukraine and Georgia, aspirants for both.

Obama - active policy in Afghanistan, more troops, limited supply roots. More bases in Eastern Europe.